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FIRST CIRCUIT 
Bonneau v. Plumbers & Pipefitters Local Union 51 Pension Trust 
Fund, 736 F.3d 33 (1st Cir. 2013) 
QUESTION; “Whether a retroactively conferred benefit during the 
course of employment constitutes a ‘benefit attributable to service’ and 
so an ‘accrued benefit’ for purposes of the [Employment Retirement 
Income Security Act’s (ERISA)] anti-cutback rule.”  Id. at 34. 
ANALYSIS; The court looked to the plain language of ERISA’s 
anti-cutback rule, which “prohibits the decrease by amendment of any 
accrued benefit of a participant in an ERISA plan.”  Id. at 35.  The court 
noted that prior to amendment, the anti-cutback rule applied only to 
“benefits attributable to service,” and therefore “accrued benefits” must 
be attributable to services already performed.  Id. at 37.  The court noted 
that § 1002(23) the provision uses the term “employee” and tethered 
“accrued benefits” to the “employee’s accumulated contribution.”  Id. at 
38.  The court read § 1002(23) and  § 1054(g)(1) together and found that 
332 SETON HALL CIRCUIT REVIEW [Vol. 10:331 
	
a “benefit may be accrued only by an ‘employee,’ but once accrued, the 
benefit is protected from diminution as long as the individual who 
accrued the benefit is a ‘participant’ in the plan, whether as an employee 
or as a retiree.”  Id. at 39.  The benefit “accrues” when it “provide[s] 
incentives for future employment[.]”  Id.  The court concluded that 
“[o]nce an individual continues employment in exchange for a promised 
benefit, that is enough . . . to generate the sort of ‘justified expectation’ 
the anti-cutback rule is designed to protect.”  Id. 
CONCLUSION; The 1st Circuit held that a retroactively conferred 
benefit can be an accrued benefit for the purpose of the anti-cutback rule.  
Id. 
 
Mazariegos-Paiz v. Holder, 734 F.3d 57 (1st Cir. 2013) 
QUESTION; Whether administrative exhaustion is satisfied when an 
agency, “either on its own initiative or at the behest of some other party 
to the proceedings, has addressed those claims on the merits, regardless 
of whether the petitioner himself raised them.”  Id. at 60. 
ANALYSIS; The court stated that Congress granted the court 
jurisdiction to review any non-constitutional claims dealing with removal 
“only if the alien has exhausted all administrative remedies” that are 
available to him as a matter of right.  Id. at 62.  The court noted that there 
are two ways in which an alien exhausts their administrative remedies.  
Id.  First, an alien presents his or her issue to the Board of Immigration 
Appeals or alternatively, the agency may elects to “address in sufficient 
detail the merits” of the particular issue.  Id. at 62–63.  The court 
reasoned that allowing these two avenues for exhaustion “creates a fully 
calibrated balance of responsibilities” by allowing aliens to seek the 
benefit of the “agency’s expertise” and also by allowing the agency to 
correct its own mistakes by addressing the issue itself.  Id. 
CONCLUSION; The 1st Circuit held, consistent with the 2nd, 3rd, 
5th, 9th, and 11th Circuits that an issue is “exhausted when it has been 
squarely presented” to and, subsequently, “squarely addressed by the 
agency,” regardless of which party initially raised the issue in question.  
Id. at 63. 
 
United States v. Melvin, 730 F.3d 29 (1st Cir. 2013) 
QUESTION; Whether law enforcement’s use of voice identification 
testimony from a police officer who heard a defendant’s voice at a 
proffer session violates law enforcement’s promise “that it would not use 
against [the defendant] . . . any statements made or other information 
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disclosed at the proffer session.”  Id. at 32 (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
ANALYSIS; The court asserted that [i]nformal immunity 
agreements, such as proffer agreements, are shaped by the language of 
the contract conferring the immunity.”  Id. at 37 (internal quotation 
marks omitted).  The court noted that “whenever possible, contracts 
should be construed to give effect to every word, clause, and phrase.”  Id. 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  The court asserted that if a proffer 
agreement includes the phrase “statements made or other information” 
the phrase “other information provided by the 
defendant . . . encompasses any knowledge the government gained at the 
proffer session because of the defendant’s presence there.”  Id. (emphasis 
added) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
CONCLUSION; The 1st Circuit held that “knowledge of [a] 
defendant’s voice tone, inflections, and speaking characteristics gleaned 
from [a] defendant’s speech at [a] proffer session is ‘other information’ 
that cannot used against [a] defendant in the government’s case in chief.”  
Id. 
Yamon v. Yamon, 730 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2013) 
QUESTION; “Whether, as a matter of law, the conclusion that a 
child is ‘now settled’ under Article 12 [of the Hague Convention] 
precludes a court from ordering return.”  Id. at 4. 
ANALYSIS; The court noted that while “[u]nder Article 12,  a 
judicial or administrative authority ‘shall . . . order the return of a child, 
unless it is demonstrated that the child is not settled in its new 
environment,” the Hague Convention does not indicated “that an 
authority is prohibited from ordering the child returned if settledness is 
found.”  Id. at 16.  The court asserted that the “[i]t is consistent with the 
Conventions overall structure that Article 12 leaves it within the court’s 
discretion whether to order the return of a ‘now settled’ child.”  Id.  The 
court posited that “[t]he Executive Branch has consistently interpreted 
Article 12 as conferring upon an authority the discretion to order the 
return of a child found ‘now settled.’”  Id. at 19.  The court noted that 
“[c]ourts of other signatory nations have held that the Convention 
confers upon a court the authority to weigh considerations such as 
concealment when determining whether to order the return of a child 
‘now settled.’”  Id. at 20.  Likewise, the court noted that “[w]hile no 
other circuit has addressed the ‘now settled defense in particular, . . . [the 
3rd, 4th, 6th, and 9th] [C]ircuits accept the general proposition that 
‘courts retain the discretion to order return even if one of the 
Convention’s exceptions is proven.”  Id. 
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CONCLUSION; The 1st Circuit held that “[c]oupled . . . with the rest 
of the text of the Convention, the Convention’s purposes, the inherent 
equitable powers of federal courts, and the insights of the Executive 
Branch, . . . the Convention confers upon a federal district court, 
authority to order, at its discretion, the return of a child found to be ‘now 
settled.’”  Id. at 21. 
 
 
SECOND CIRCUIT 
Kreisberg v. Healthbridge Management., L.L.C., 732 F.3d 131 (2d Cir. 
2013) 
QUESTION; Whether the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) 
“may delegate its power to authorize § 10(j) actions to the General 
Counsel” under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).  Id. at 134, 
139. 
ANALYSIS; The court noted that the statutory language of 29 U.S.C. 
§ 153(d) provides that the General Counsel “shall have such other duties 
as the [NLRB] may prescribe or as may be provided by law.”  Id. at 139.  
The court reasoned that the plain language of the statute “permits a 
property constituted [NLRB] to delegate its § 10(j) power and enable the 
General Counsel to prosecute NLRA violations before a federal district 
court.”  Id. at 140. 
CONCLUSION; The 2nd Circuit held that the NLRB may delegate 
its power to authorize § 10(j) actions.  Id. at 142. 
 
 
THIRD CIRCUIT 
Friedman’s Liquidating Trust v. Roth Staffing Cos., 738 F.3d 547 (3d. 
Cir. 2013) 
QUESTION; Whether  “a post-petition payment to a creditor 
pursuant to a Wage Order entered at a debtor’s request reduce the 
creditor’s the creditor’s new value defense – and thereby increase 
preference liability – the same as it would if the payment had been made 
pre-petition.”  Id. at 549. 
ANALYSIS; The 3rd Circuit observed that the Bankruptcy Code 
provisions should be viewed as a whole and that “[c]ontext is therefore 
key in determining the meaning of a particular provision.”  Id. at 549.  
First, the court noted that the provision at issue here dealt with the 
“preferences” section of the Code.  Id. at 553.  The court found that this 
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clearly suggested that this section “concerns transactions occurring 
during the preference period” and not post-petition.  Id. at 550–51.  Next, 
the court noted that the “hypothetical liquidation test must be performed 
as of the petition date points to that date as the cutoff for determining 
new value.”  Id. at 554.  The court found that “extending preference 
analysis past the petition date would be inconsistent with [the statute].”  
Id. at 555.  Additionally, the court found that the statute of limitations 
began to run as of the petition date and “[i]f Congress had intended to 
allow post-petition transactions to affect the impact on the estate, it is 
likely it would have crafted a different statute of limitations.”  Id. at 555–
56.  The court also observed, “[b]ecause Congress specifically articulated 
an intention – in an analogous defense to preference liability – to confine 
the analysis to pre-petition activity, we should assume it had the same 
intention with respect to new value defenses.  Id. at 557.  Finally, the 
court found that other courts that reviewed this issue “concluded that the 
new value advanced after the petition date should not be considered in a 
creditor’s new value defense.”  Id. at 558. 
CONCLUSION; The 3rd Circuit held that a transfer “made after the 
filing of a bankruptcy petition . . . does not affect the new value defense.”  
Id. at 550. 
 
Papotto v. Hartford Life & Accident Insurance Co., 731 F.3d 265 (3d 
Cir. 2013) 
QUESTION; “Whether a remand to an ERISA plan administrator is 
a final decision and qualifies for review pursuant to § 1291.”  Id. at 270. 
ANALYSIS; The court engaged in a three-step analysis developed in 
Kreider Dairy Farms, Inc. v. Glickman, 190 F.3d 113 (3d Cir. 1999), to 
determine when a “remand to an administrative agency may be deemed 
final” for purposes of § 1291.  Id. at 270.  First, the court considered 
“whether the remand order of the District Court ‘finally resolves’ the 
underlying issue of the case.”  Id. at 273.  Second, the court determined if 
the legal issue is important.  Id. at 273.  Finally, the court considered 
“whether the denial of immediate review [would] foreclose appellate 
review as a practical matter.”  Id. at 274 (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  The court determined from this analysis that the “District 
Court only administratively closed, and thus . . . retained jurisdiction 
over, the proceeding below,” and that “either party may, at any time, 
move to re-open proceedings and seek . . . review.”  Id. at 275. 
CONCLUSION; The 3rd Circuit held that an administrative agency 
will not necessarily always qualify for review pursuant to § 1291 and that 
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“the District Court’s remand order directing the Plan Administrator to 
read causation into . . . [a provision] is not final.”  Id. at 276. 
 
S.H. v. Lower Merion School District, 729 F.3d 248 (3d Cir. 2013) 
QUESTION; Whether “the jurisdictional umbrella” of the 
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) “encompasses not 
merely children with disabilities, but also children who have been 
misidentified as disabled.”  Id. at 257. 
ANALYSIS; Under §1415(a) “[t]he IDEA guarantees procedural 
safeguards with respect to the provision of a free appropriate public 
education to children with disabilities and their parents.”  Id.  The court 
further reasoned, “there is no indication that the term ‘child with a 
disability’ includes children who are mistakenly identified as disabled, 
but who are, in fact, not disabled.”  Id. at 257–58. 
CONCLUSION; The 3rd Circuit held, “under the Act’s plain 
language, it is clear that the IDEA creates a cause of action only for 
individuals with disabilities.”  Id. at 258. 
 
United States v. Fish, 731 F.3d 277 (3rd Cir. 2013) 
QUESTION; Whether a District Court’s application of U.S.S.G. 
§ 2S1.1(b)(3) should be reviewed under a plenary standard or under a 
clear error standard.  Id. at 279. 
ANALYSIS; The 3rd Circuit first reviewed challenges to a district 
court’s application of the Guidelines in other contexts.  Id.  The court 
reasoned that in cases where “there is no dispute over the factual 
determinations but the issue is whether the agreed-upon set of facts fit 
within the enhancement requirements, [it has] . . . reviewed for clear 
error the district court’s applications of those facts to the Guidelines.”  
Id. 
CONCLUSION; The 3rd Circuit held that the clear error standard, 
not the plenary standard, applied in reviewing “the application of the 
undisputed facts to the requirements for the [sentencing] enhancement 
for sophisticated money laundering.”  Id. 
 
United States v. Gause, 536 Fed. Appx. 234 (3d Cir. 2013). 
QUESTION; Whether an 18 U.S.C § 3147 sentencing enhancement 
applies to violations of 18 U.S.C. § 3146 failure to appear.  Id. at 236. 
ANALYSIS; The court noted that seven circuits, including the 1st, 
4th, 5th, 6th, 9th, and 11th Circuits, have held that § 3147 encompasses 
violations of § 3146.  Id.  These circuits have “reasoned that the terms of 
the statute are unambiguous” in holding that “by its plain terms, § 3147 
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encompasses violations of § 3146.”  Id.  The court reasoned that because 
the language of § 3147 is clear and unambiguous, the judicial inquiry 
was complete.  Id. at 237. 
CONCLUSION; The 3rd Circuit joined its sister circuits in holding 
that the § 3147 sentencing enhancement applied to § 3146 failure to 
appear.  Id. 
 
United States v. Jones, 740 F.3d 127 (3d Cir. 2014) 
QUESTION; Whether “‘assault’ under [U.S.S.G.] § 3A1.2(c)(1) 
requires assaultive conduct whereby [an individual] caused an official 
victim to actually experience apprehension of immediate bodily injury.”  
Id. at 138. 
ANALYSIS; The court noted that the 1st, 3rd, 4th, 7th, and 8th 
Circuits have held “that assault under § 3A1.2(c)(1) should generally be 
read as a reference to common law criminal assault.”  Id. (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  The court stated that it was aware of no court 
of appeals that has held to the contrary.”  Id.  The court agreed with the 
assault definition articulated by the 1st Circuit that “[c]ommon law 
assault embraces two different crimes; one is attempted battery, . . . an 
intended effort to cause bodily harm to another which falls short of 
success regardless of whether the intended victim knows of the attempt, 
[and] [t]he other . . . is an act which is intended to, and reasonably does, 
cause the victim to fear immediate bodily harm; such menacing 
constitutes assault even if no physical harm is attempted, achieved or 
required.”  Id. at 139 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
CONCLUSION; The 3rd Circuit, “in interpreting 
§ 3A1.2(c)(1), . . . [held] in accord with [its] sister circuits that assault is 
defined according to its common-law definition.”  Id. at 138. 
 
United States v. Ward, 732 F.3d 175 (3d Cir. 2013) 
QUESTION; Whether FED. R. CRIM. P. 32 “affords all criminal 
defendants the right to deliver an unsworn allocution.”  Id. at 180. 
ANALYSIS; The court noted that a criminal defendant has the “right 
to make a statement to the sentencing court” whether such allocution is 
sworn or unsworn.  Id. at 182.  This allows a defendant to “raise 
mitigating circumstances and to present his individualized situation to 
the sentencing court.”  Id.  The court observed that defendant assumes a 
risk because an allocution “whether sworn or unsworn . . . can be used in 
subsequent criminal prosecutions.”  Id. at 183.  Therefore, “if defendant 
is concerned about the future use of his statement against him, it makes 
no difference whether the statement was sworn or not.”  Id.  Finally, the 
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court noted that “the sentencing judge has always retained the discretion 
to place certain restrictions on what may be presented during an 
allocution.”  Id. at 182. 
CONCLUSION; The 3rd Circuit held that FED. R. CRIM. P. 32 does 
not guarantee a criminal defendant can make an unsworn allocution.  Id. 
at 184. 
 
 
FOURTH CIRCUIT 
Cosey v. Prudential Insurance Co. of America, 735 F.3d 161 (4th Cir. 
2013) 
QUESTION; “[W]hether the phrase ‘proof satisfactory to the plan 
administrator’ unambiguously confers discretionary decision-making 
authority on a plan administrator” in a plan subject to the Employee 
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA).  Id. at 166. 
ANALYSIS; The court noted that the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 7th, and 9th 
Circuits “have held that [the] language [‘proof satisfactory to the plan 
administrator’] does not unambiguously confer . . . discretionary 
authority.”  Id.  The court “agree[d]” with the conclusions reached by 
[the] five sister circuits.  Id.  The court posited “that the phrase ‘proof 
satisfactory to us’ is inherently ambiguous,” and that the 4th Circuit 
“require[s] . . . clear plain language that expressly creates discretionary 
authority.”  Id. at 166–67.  The court noted that the language at issue 
does not give insured employees “sufficient notice whether their plan 
administrator has broad, unchanneled discretion to deny claims.”  Id. at 
167 (internal quotation marks omitted).  Finally, the court stated that it 
“is [a] well settled principle that ambiguities in an ERISA plan must be 
construed against the administrator responsible for drafting the plan.”  Id. 
at 168. 
CONCLUSION; The 4th Circuit joined the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 7th, and 9th 
Circuits in “declin[ing] to impose an abuse-of-discretion standard review 
based solely on a plan’s requirement that claimants submit ‘proof 
satisfactory to the plan administrator.’”  Id. 
 
Gaines Motor Lines, Inc. v. Klaussner Furniture Industries Inc., 734 
F.3d 296 (4th Cir. 2013) 
QUESTION; Whether federal courts, absent a federal tariff, “have 
subject matter jurisdiction over a motor carrier’s breach of contract claim 
against a shipper for unpaid freight charges” under the Interstate 
Commerce Commission Termination Act (ICCTA).  Id. at 299, 302. 
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ANALYSIS; The court noted that 49 U.S.C. § 14101(b)(2) provides 
that the exclusive remedy for beach of contract authorized by 
§ 14101(b)(1) “shall be an action in an appropriate State court or United 
States district court.”  Id. at 304.  The court reasoned that Congress, by 
authorizing “motor carriers to privately negotiate rates . . . does not 
imply that Congress intended . . . to federalize every resulting breach of 
contract claim.”  Id.  Rather, the court noted, that “motor carriers can 
only sue in an ‘appropriate’ court.”  Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 4th Circuit held that when operating under a 
private contract, instead of a federal tariff, a party must first establish an 
alternative basis for federal jurisdiction before a federal court can 
adjudicate the dispute.  Id. at 305. 
 
Othi v. Holder, 734 F.3d 259  (4th Cir. 2013) 
QUESTION; Whether 8 U.S.C. “[§] 1101, as amended by IIRIRA 
[Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act], still 
allows for the case-by-case analysis of an alien’s intent under Rosenberg 
v. Fleuti, 374 U.S. 449 (1963), when determining whether the alien is 
‘seeking an admission’ for purposes of removal proceedings.”  Id. at 265. 
ANALYSIS; The court then noted that the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 5th, 7th, 9th, 
10th and 11th Circuits has found that the Fleuti doctrine did not survive 
IIRIRA amendments, albeit in different ways.  Id. 266.  The court 
reasoned that Congress’ enactment of § 1101(a)(13)(C) provided 
exemptions that barred a “legally permanent resident” (LPR) from 
automatic admission back into the country.  Id. at 267.  The court found 
that part (v) of section 1101(a)(13)(C) applied to a LPR who previously 
“committed an offense identified in § 1182(a)(2) of this title.”  Id.  Thus, 
LPRs who fall in this category are “back into the general class of ‘aliens’ 
and are treated as all other aliens for ‘admission’ purposes.”  Id. 
CONCLUSION; The 4th Circuit held, in accordance with 1st, 2nd, 
3rd, 5th, 7th, 9th, 10th, and 11th Circuits, that the IIRIRA’s plain 
language ended the Fleuti doctrine, and thus placed an LPR who 
previously committed an offense into the general class of “aliens.”  Id. 
 
United States v. McManus, 734 F.3d 315 (4th Cir. 2013) 
QUESTION; What is “[t]he proper manner of applying the five-level 
[U.S.S.G.] § 2G2.2(b)(3)(B) enhancement to a defendant’s use of a file-
sharing program to distribute child pornography?”  Id. at 318. 
ANALYSIS; The court noted that the phrase “distribution for 
the . . . expectation of receipt of a thing in value” of § 2G2.2(b)(3)(B) 
was unambiguous.  Id. at 318–19.  The court reasoned, based on the plain 
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reading of the text that once the Government has proven distribution, it 
must then show that the defendant distributed pornography with the 
“belief that he would get something of value in return.”  Id.  Thus, the 
court found that “to trigger the § 2G2.2(b)(3)(B) five-level enhancement, 
the Government must show that the defendant: (1) knowingly made child 
pornography in his possession available to others by some means, and (2) 
made his pornographic materials available for the specific purpose of 
obtaining something of valuable consideration, such as more 
pornography, whether or not he actually succeeded in obtaining the 
desired thing of value.”  Id. at 319.  The court found that “it [was] clearly 
possible based on the features of the system that a user [of the file-
sharing program] could distribute his files without any reasonable 
expectation of receiving anything of value in exchange.”  Id. at 322. 
CONCLUSION; The 4th Circuit held the five-level enhancement 
under the U.S.S.G. does not apply unless the Government “submit[s] 
sufficient individualized evidence of [a defendant’s] intent to distribute 
his [or her] pornographic materials in expectation of receipt of a thing of 
value.”  Id. 
 
 
FIFTH CIRCUIT 
 
D.R. Horton, Inc. v. NLRB, 737 F.3d 344 (5th Cir. 2013) 
QUESTION; Whether “the rights of collective action embodied in 
[the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA)] make the NLRA 
distinguishable from cases which hold that arbitration must be individual 
arbitration[.]”  Id. at 362. 
ANALYSIS; The court explained that “no court decision prior to the 
Board’s ruling under review . . . had held that the [NLRA] Section 7 
right to engage in ‘concerted activities for the purpose of . . . other 
mutual aid or protection’ prohibited class action waivers in arbitration 
agreements.”  Id. at 356.  The court noted that both precedent by the 
NLRB and other circuits have held that Section 7 of the NLRA protects 
collective-suit filings, “whether in lawsuits or in arbitration.”  Id. at 356–
57.  In addition, the court found no inherent conflict between the NLRA 
and the Federal Arbitration Act that would make such protection invalid.  
Id. at 361.  The court further reasoned that it was “loath to create a circuit 
split” because the 2nd, 8th, and 9th Circuits, which previously addressed 
the question, have held arbitration agreements containing class waivers 
to be enforceable.  Id. at 362. 
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CONCLUSION; The 5th Circuit held that the rights of collective 
action in the NLRA do not make those cases distinguishable from cases 
that hold that arbitration must be individual.  Id. 
 
EEOC v. Boh Brothers Construction Co., 731 F.3d 444 (5th Cir. 2013) 
QUESTION; Whether the three evidentiary paths for plaintiffs put 
forth by the Supreme Court in Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, 
523 U.S. 75 (1998), “are the exclusive paths to success on a Title VII 
same-sex harassment claim” or are merely illustrative.”  Id. at 455. 
ANALYSIS; The court reasoned that because in Oncale the Court 
employed phrasing such as “for example” and “[w]hatever evidentiary 
route the plaintiff chooses to follow” in its discussion of the evidentiary 
paths, an exclusive interpretation would be impractical.  Id.  The court 
noted that the 3rd, 7th, 8th, and 10th Circuits have “held that the Oncale 
categories are illustrative, not exhaustive, in nature.”  Id. 
CONCLUSION; The 5th Circuit held that the evidentiary paths in 
Oncale “are illustrative, not exhaustive, in nature.”  Id. 
 
Moore v. CITGO Refining & Chemicals Co., 735 F.3d 309 (5th Cir. 
2013) 
QUESTION; Whether, pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 54(d), the 
combination of plaintiffs’ good faith, a defendant’s “enormous wealth,” 
and plaintiffs’ “limited resources” serves a sufficient basis for a district 
court to reduce or to deny costs to a prevailing defendant.  Id. at 319–20. 
ANALYSIS; The court noted that “at least four circuits . . . have 
rejected a ‘relative wealth’ rationale,” and stated that “[t]he fact that the 
prevailing party is substantially more wealthy than the losing party is not 
a sufficient ground for denying or limiting costs to the prevailing party.”  
Id. at 320.  The court looked to the plain language of the Rule and opined 
that Congress did not intend FED. R. CIV. P. 54(d) to be swallowed by an 
“enormous” or “relative” wealth exception.  Id.  The court reasoned that 
barring even a wealthy defendant from recovering costs, the court 
reasoned, would be “impermissibly punitive.” as it would “undermine 
the foundation . . . that justice is administered to all equally, regardless of 
wealth or status.”  Id. 
CONCLUSION; The 5th Circuit held that, “[c]onsistent with the 
great weight of authority from the federal circuits, reducing or 
eliminating a prevailing party’s cost award based on its wealth—either 
relative or absolute—is impermissible as a matter of law.”  Id. 
 
Nguyen v. Holder, 542 Fed. Appx. 384 (5th Cir. 2013) 
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QUESTION; Whether a refugee who previously adjusted her status 
to that of a lawful permanent resident (LPR) is eligible to readjust to 
LPR status using the § 209(c) waiver of inadmissibility under the 
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA).  Id. at 388. 
ANALYSIS; The court first looked to § 209 of the INA, which the 
Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) has interpreted as only allowing 
those aliens who have not previously acquired LPR status to seek 
adjustment.  Id. at 390. The court reasoned that since § 209 was 
sufficiently ambiguous, the BIA’s interpretation was reasonable and 
entitled to Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 
Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) deference.  Id. at 391.  The court also noted 
that “several of [its] sister circuits have also agreed that an alien who has 
already adjusted from refugee to LPR status is ineligible for a § 209(c) 
waiver.” Id. 
CONCLUSION; The 5th Circuit, relying on the BIA’s interpretation 
of § 209, held that a refugee who has already adjusted to LPR status may 
not readjust under § 209, and thus is not eligible for a § 209(c) waiver.  
Id. at 391, 393. 
 
Simmons v. Sabine River Authority State of Louisiana, 732 F.3d 469 
(5th Cir. 2013) 
QUESTION; Whether “the Federal Power Act [(FPA)] preempts 
property damage claims under state law where the claim alleges 
negligence for failing to act in a manner FERC [Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission] expressly declined to mandate while operating 
a FERC-licensed project.”  Id. at 471. 
ANALYSIS; The court noted that the FPA contains a savings clause, 
16 U.S.C. § 821, which expressly preserves certain state causes of action 
for property damages against licensees.  Id. at 474.  The court determined 
that the savings clause is limited in that it only exempts “requirements 
that reflect [or] establish proprietary rights or rights of the same nature as 
those relating to the use of water in irrigation or for municipal purposes.”  
Id. at 476 (internal quotation marks omitted).  The court noted that the 
Supreme Court has held that the FPA occupies the field of public water 
use and power generation, with the exception of water use rights.  Id. at 
476. 
CONCLUSION; The 5th Circuit held that, because the state laws at 
issue infringe on the operational control of a power generation plant by a 
FPA licensee, the FPA preempts conflicting state law property damage 
claims.  Id. at  477. 
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United States v. Moore, 733 F.3d 161 (5th Cir. 2013) 
QUESTION; Whether the Sentencing Guidelines under the 
Application Note 4(C)(ii)(I) of 18 U.S.C. app. § 2B1.1 (“sub-sub-
paragraph I”) permit the district court to presume that there were at least 
fifty victims when calculating an offense level in a case that involves 
theft of United States Postal Service (“Postal Service”) mail from more 
than one of the Postal Service’s own collection boxes.  Id. at 162. 
ANALYSIS; The court looked to the plain language of the special 
rule and noted that “if the case involved a collection box, it is the case 
itself, not the collection box or boxes, that is presumed to have involved 
at least 50 victims; the collection box itself does not have victims.”  Id. at 
164.  The court found no basis in the plain language of sub-sub-
paragraph I for a presumption of fifty additional victims for each 
additional Postal Service receptacle.  Id.  The court reasoned that “this 
plain reading of sub-sub-paragraph I is confirmed by comparing it to the 
companion provision in sub-sub-paragraph II, which governs ‘housing 
unit cluster’ boxes.”  Id. at 164–65. 
CONCLUSION; The 5th Circuit held that the sub-sub-paragraph I of 
the Sentencing Guidelines allows the district court to presume that there 
were at least 50 victims when calculating an offense level in a case that 
involved one or more Postal Service’s collection boxes, but, outside of 
sentencing purposes, the rule does not permit the presumption of more 
than 50 victims.  Id. at 167. 
 
Valdiviez-Hernandez v. Holder, 739 F.3d 184 (5th Cir. 2013) 
QUESTION; Whether “expedited removal proceedings apply only to 
lawfully admitted non-permanent resident aliens who committed 
aggravated felonies.”  Id. at 188. 
ANALYSIS; The court noted that the 3rd, 4th, 7th, and 9th Circuits 
have uniformly rejected the proposition that the expedited removal 
proceedings enumerated under 8 U.S.C. § 1228(b) are inapplicable to 
aliens who are not admitted to the United States.  Id.  The court reasoned 
that while an analysis under § 1227 would yield such a result, applying 
its limits would result in a “complete variance from the thrust of 
§ 1228(b).”  Id. at 190.  The court further explained that the regulations 
adopted by the Department of Homeland Security provide that “the 
expedited procedures apply even if the alien has never been admitted.”  
Id. at 191. 
CONCLUSION; The 5th Circuit held that “§ 1228(b)’s expedited 
removal process applies to all aliens convicted of an aggravated felony 
who are not admitted for permanent residence.”  Id. 
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SIXTH CIRCUIT 
Grant, Konvalinka & Harrison, P.C. v. Still, 737 F.3d 1034 (6th Cir. 
2013) 
QUESTION ONE; Whether the creditor in a bankruptcy case “bears 
the burden of establishing the validity of a creditor’s security interest in 
debtor’s property.”  Id. at 1036. 
ANALYSIS; The court began by noting that “numerous bankruptcy 
courts in other jurisdictions have imposed . . . [the burden of establishing 
the validity of a creditor’s security interest] on creditors seeking relief 
under 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(2).”  Id. at 1038–39.  The court reasoned that 
requiring creditors to carry the burden of proof is sound judicial policy 
because “the creditor will likely be in the best position to show that its 
interest is valid.”  Id. at 1040. 
CONCLUSION; The 6th Circuit held that the burden of establishing 
the validity of a security interest falls on the creditor seeking relief.  Id. 
QUESTION TWO; Whether a bankruptcy “trustee may use his 
hypothetical lien-creditor status and avoidance powers to oppose a 
motion for relief from the automatic stay after the expiration of the two-
year statutory limitation on avoidance actions under 11 U.S.C. 
§ 546(a)(1)(A).”  Id. at 1036. 
ANALYSIS; The court began by noting that the most common 
approach in bankruptcy courts, which has also been adopted by the 9th 
Circuit, is that “a trustee may use his avoidance powers defensively 
following the expiration of the statutory limitation on filing avoidance 
actions.”  Id. at 1041.  The court noted that the 1st, 7th, and 9th Circuits 
“permitted trustees to object to claims after the limitations period had 
run” when “construing the predecessor to § 502(d).  Id.  at 1042.  Finally, 
the court observed that “the majority view . . . furthers one of the central 
purposes of the Bankruptcy Code—to ensure the equality of the 
distribution among creditors of the debtor.”  Id. (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
CONCLUSION; The 6th Circuit held that “the bankruptcy court 
properly adopted the majority view in holding that [a] [t]rustee was 
entitled to use his avoidance powers defensively without regard to the 
two-year statute of limitations under 11 U.S.C. § 546(a)(1)(A).”  Id. 
 
United States v. Church, 731 F.3d 530 (6th Cir. 2013) 
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QUESTION; Whether under 18 U.S.C. § 3663A a defendant is 
obligated to pay restitution to third-party medical providers who have 
provided medical treatment to victim(s) of the defendant’s wrongdoing.  
Id. at 536. 
ANALYSIS; The 6th Circuit noted that the 4th and 9th Circuits have 
held that “third-party medical providers are entitled to restitution when 
they pay some or all of the cost of the victim’s medical treatment 
themselves,” because of the statute’s language providing “that a 
defendant must . . . pay what it costs to care for the victim, whether or 
not the victim paid for the care or was obligated to do so.”  Id.  The court 
contrasted the expansive language in § 3663A from language in other 
restitution statues, which define a victim’s losses as “costs incurred by 
the victim.”  Id.  The court reasoned that the statute’s stated purpose “to 
ensure that the offender realizes the damage caused by the offense and 
pays the debt owed to the victim as well as to society” also supports the 
4th and 9th Circuits’ holdings.  Id. 
CONCLUSION; The 6th Circuit agreed with the 4th and 9th Circuits 
and held that a defendant is obligated under 18 U.S.C. § 3663A to pay 
restitution to third-party medical providers who have provided medical 
treatment to the defendant’s victim(s).  Id. at 636–37. 
 
United States v. Miller, 734 F.3d 530 (6th Cir. 2013) 
QUESTION; Whether a criminal defendant “uses” a person’s name 
under 18 U.S.C. § 1028A to fraudulently obtain a loan by lying and 
misrepresenting his authority to act on behalf of an individual.  Id. at 
539–40. 
ANALYSIS; The court noted that “uses” is not defined in the statute.  
Id. at 540–41.  The court found that the two reasonable interpretations 
advanced by the parties based on the words ordinary meaning and 
statutory interpretation created ambiguity in the statute. Id. The court 
reasoned that when faced with multiple reasonable interpretations of 
“uses” and “no conclusive guidance from the legislative history or case 
law,” it must apply the rule of lenity, which requires that vague criminal 
statutes be interpreted as most favorable for the defendant.  Id. at 542. 
CONCLUSION; The 6th Circuit held that a defendant does “not ‘use’ 
a means of identification within the meaning of §1028A by” 
misrepresenting his authority to act on behalf of an individual in order to 
obtain a loan.  Id. 
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EIGHTH CIRCUIT 
United States v. Ashcraft, 732 F.3d 860 (8th Cir. 2013) 
QUESTION; Whether disability payments are “earnings” within the 
meaning of the Consumer Credit Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. § 167(a), and 
subject to garnishment despite the fact that an employee rendered his or 
her services before receiving disability payments.  Id. at 861. 
ANALYSIS; The court found that payments are considered 
“earnings” if they amount to “compensation paid or payable for personal 
services” regardless of how an employee’s payments are labeled.  Id. at 
864.  The court reasoned that disability payments fit within the definition 
of earnings because they serve as replacement income for personal 
services performed by employees in the past, although an employee 
receiving disability payments may no longer be rendering services to the 
employer.  Id. 
CONCLUSION; The 8th Circuit held that disability payments are 
subject to garnishment under the Consumer Credit Protection Act 
because they fall within the definition of “earnings” even if an employer 
receives personal services before an employee receives payments.  Id. at 
865. 
 
 
NINTH CIRCUIT 
Herb Reed Enterprises LLC v. Florida Entertainment Management, 
736 F.3d 1239 (9th Cir. 2013) 
QUESTION; Whether “the likelihood of irreparable harm must be 
established—rather than presumed, as under prior [9th] Circuit 
precedent—by a plaintiff seeking injunctive relief in the trademark 
context.”  Id. at 1242. 
ANALYSIS; The court noted that it had previously held “that the 
likelihood of irreparable injury may be presumed from a showing of 
likelihood of success on the merits of a trademark infringement claim,” 
however the Supreme Court has recently held that a “plaintiff must 
establish irreparable injury when seeking a permanent injunction, applies 
in the patent context.”  Id. 1248–49 (internal quotation marks omitted).  
The court noted that the Supreme Court has also recently held that “the 
requirement that a plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction demonstrate 
that irreparable injury is likely in the absence of an injunction.”  Id. at 
1249 (internal quotation marks omitted).  The court noted that it 
previously “held that likely irreparable harm must be demonstrated to 
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obtain a permanent injunction in a trademark infringement action.”  Id.  
The court noted that the 6th and 11th Circuits have held “that a plaintiff 
must establish irreparable harm—applies to a preliminary injunction in 
the trademark infringement case.”  Id. 
CONCLUSION; The 9th Circuit joined the 6th and 11th Circuits in 
holding “that a plaintiff must establish irreparable harm . . . [to obtain] a 
preliminary injunction in a trademark infringement case.”  Id. 
 
In re Wal-Mart, 737 F.3d 1262 (9th Cir. 2013) 
QUESTION; The 9th Circuit addressed whether “a non-appealability 
clause in an arbitration agreement that eliminates all federal court review 
of arbitration awards, including review under § 10 of the Federal 
Arbitration Act (FAA)” is enforceable.  Id. at 1264. 
ANALYSIS; The court reasoned that “[p]ermitting parties to 
contractually eliminate all judicial review of arbitration awards would 
not only run counter to the text of the FAA, but would also frustrate 
Congress’s attempt to ensure a minimum level of due process for parties 
to an arbitration.”  Id. at 1268.  The court opined that “[i]f parties could 
contract around this section of the FAA, the balance Congress intended 
would be disrupted, and parties would be left without any safeguards 
against arbitral abuse.”  Id. 
CONCLUSION; The 9th Circuit held that 9 U.S.C. § 10(a) could not 
be waived or eliminated by contract.  Id. 
 
Obsidian Financial Group, LLC v. Cox, 740 F.3d 1284 (9th Cir. 2014) 
QUESTION; “[W]hether First Amendment defamation rules apply 
equally to both the institutional press and individual speakers.”  Id. at 
1291. 
ANALYSIS; The 9th Circuit observed that the 2nd, 4th, 8th, 10th, 
and D.C. Circuits have all “held that the First Amendment defamation 
rules in Sullivan and its progeny apply equally to the institutional press 
and individual speakers.”  Id.  The court posited that “the protections of 
the First Amendment do not turn on whether the defendant was a trained 
journalist, formally affiliated with traditional news entities, engaged in 
conflict-of-interest disclosure, went beyond just assembling others’ 
writings or tried to get both sides of a story.”  Id.  The court agreed with 
the Supreme Court’s prior reasoning that “a First Amendment distinction 
between the decline of print and broadcast media the line between the 
media and others who wish to comment on political and social issues 
becomes far more blurred.”  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  The 
court noted further that “[i]n defamation cases,  the public-figure status 
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of a plaintiff and the public important of the statement at issue – not the 
identify of the speaker –provide the First Amendment touchstones.”  Id. 
CONCLUSION; The 9th Circuit agreed with its sister circuits and 
held that the “negligence requirement for private defamation actions is 
not limited to cases with institutional media defendants.”  Id. 
 
Piñon v. Bank of America, NA, 741 F.3d 1022 (9th Cir. 2014). 
QUESTION; Whether the “principles of substantive due process 
developed by the Supreme Court in the tort context [apply] to liquidated 
damages clauses in private contracts,” such as credit card fees.  Id. at 
1026. 
ANALYSIS; The court distinguished liquidated damages provisions 
in a contract, which are enforceable “if the damages flowing from the 
breach are likely to be difficult to ascertain or prove at the time of 
agreement and the liquidated sum represents a good faith effort by the 
parties to appraise the benefit of the bargain,” from unenforceable 
penalty clauses which are designed to punish the breaching party or 
coerce his performance.  Id.  The court reasoned that punitive damages 
are most common in tort, and are generally not recoverable for breach of 
contract unless the conduct is also a tort.  Id.  The court noted that 
punitive damages were not developed for compensation purposes, but 
rather are aimed at retribution and deterring future harmful conduct.  Id. 
at 1027.  The court reasoned that since the penalty clauses leading to 
credit card fees originated from private contracts, “they are distinct from 
jury-determined punitive damages awards . . . .”  Id. 
CONCLUSION; The 9th Circuit held that “the due process analysis 
developed in the context of jury-awarded punitive damages is not 
applicable to contractual penalty clauses.”  Id. 
 
Rodriguez-Castellon v. Holder, 733 F.3d 847 (9th Cir. 2013) 
QUESTION; Whether an alien’s state crime conviction of lewd and 
lascivious acts upon a 14- or 15-year-old child qualifies as a “crime of 
violence” under 18 U.S.C. § 16(b), and is thus an “aggravated felony” 
under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) rendering him or her deportable.  Id. 
at 850. 
ANALYSIS; The court noted that the Immigration and Nationality 
Act defines “aggravated felony” to mean, among other things, a “crime 
of violence” under § 16(b).  Id. at 852.  The court reasoned that under 
§ 16(b), a state crime is a “crime of violence” if it is (1) a felony and (2) 
“involves a substantial risk that physical force against the person . . . of 
another may be used in the course of committing the offense.”  Id. at 
Spring 2014] First Impressions 349 
	
854.  The court noted that the 2nd, 5th, 8th, 10th, and 11th Circuits have 
found that state statutes criminalizing sexual conduct by an older adult 
with children 14-15 years old constitutes a crime of violence as defined 
by § 16(b).  Id. at 856–57.  The court reasoned that a felony conviction 
under California Penal Code § 288(c)(1) was a “crime of violence” 
because it raised a substantial risk that physical force would be employed 
to ensure the child’s compliance.  Id. at 860. 
CONCLUSION; The 9th Circuit held that a state conviction for 
sexual conduct upon a 14 or 15-year-old child qualifies as a “crime of 
violence” under § 16(b) because it presents a substantial risk of the use 
of force in the ordinary case.  Id. 
 
Seven Arts Filmed Entertainment, Ltd. v. Content Media Corp., 733 
F.3d 1251 (9th Cir. 2013) 
QUESTION; Whether “a claim for copyright infringement in which 
ownership is the disputed issue is time-barred if a freestanding ownership 
claim would be barred.”  Id. at 1255. 
ANALYSIS; The court noted that the 2nd and 6th Circuits “have 
held that where the gravamen of a copyright infringement suit is 
ownership, and a freestanding ownership claim would be time-barred, 
any infringement claims are also barred.”  Id.  The 9th Circuit agreed 
with this reasoning, stating that “[o]ur sister circuits’ approach makes 
good sense—allowing infringement claims to establish ownership where 
a freestanding ownership claim would be time-barred would permit 
plaintiffs to skirt the statute of limitations for ownership claims and lead 
to results that are potentially bizarre[.]”  Id. (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  The court further reasoned that “[a]n alternative approach 
would allow plaintiffs who claim to be owners, but who are time-barred 
from pursuing their ownership claims forthrightly, simply to restyle their 
claims as ‘infringement’ and proceed without restriction.”  Id. 
CONCLUSION; The 9th Circuit joined the 2nd and 6th Circuits and 
held “that an untimely ownership claim will bar a claim for copyright 
infringement where the gravamen of the dispute is ownership, at least 
where, as here, the parties are in a close relationship.”  Id. at 1258. 
 
Shapiro v. Henson, 739 F.3d 1198 (9th Cir. 2014) 
QUESTION; “[W]hether a trustee’s turnover power is solely 
restricted to recovering bankruptcy estate property, or its value, from 
entities having ‘possession, custody, or control’ (collectively 
‘possession’) of such property at the time the motion for turnover is 
filed.”  Id. at 1200. 
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ANALYSIS; The court reasoned that “[t]he plain language 
of [Bankruptcy Code] § 542(a), pre-Code practice, and the context of 
other Code provisions indicate that the trustee’s turnover power is not 
restricted to property of the estate at the time the motion is filed.”  Id. at 
1200.  The court found that the phrases “during the case” and “or the 
value of such property” in § 542(a) demonstrate “the trustee’s power to 
move for turnover against an entity that does not have possession, 
custody, or control of property of the estate at the time the motion is 
filed.”  Id. at 1202.  The court stated that “[i]f the trustee can only move 
for turnover against an entity currently in possession of the property, that 
entity could avoid liability under §542(a) simply by transferring the 
property,” therefore § 542(a) fills a gap in the trustee’s avoiding powers 
by allowing them to proceed against someone who had possession of the 
property of the estate when the bankruptcy proceeding began, but then 
transfers it.  Id. at 1203. 
CONCLUSION; The 9th Circuit held that “a trustee may seek 
turnover from an entity that had possession, custody, or control of the 
subject property during the bankruptcy case whether or not the entity had 
possession, custody or control at the time the turnover motion is filed.”  
Id. at 1204 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 
Tobar v. United States, 731 F.3d 938 (9th Cir. 2013) 
QUESTION; Whether the discretionary function exception to 
sovereign immunity applies to claims under the Public Vessels Act 
(PVA).  Id. at 945. 
ANALYSIS; The court first noted that the 4th, 5th, and 11th Circuits 
“have held that the discretionary function exception applies to claims 
under the PVA.”  Id.  The court noted “Congress’s intent to exempt 
discretionary functions from independent judicial review” and reasoned 
that in light of such intent, the discretionary function exception must be 
applied to the PVA as it is to the Suits in Admiralty Act.  Id. 
CONCLUSION; The 9th Circuit joined the 4th, 5th, and 11th Circuits 
in holding that the discretionary function exception applies to claims 
under the PVA.  Id.  The 9th Circuit also joined the 4th, 5th, and 11th 
Circuits “in holding that the discretionary function exception applies” 
specifically to the PVA’s waiver of sovereign immunity.  Id. 
 
United States v. King, 735 F.3d 1098 (9th Cir. 2013) 
QUESTION; Whether a defendant charged with unlawful dealing in 
firearms in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(1)(A) is entitled to receive a 
jury instruction requiring the government to prove that the defendant 
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“was not acting as an authorized agent of a federal firearms licensee.”  
Id. at 1101. 
ANALYSIS; The court noted that an authorized agent is included in 
§ 922(a)(1)(A)’s terms “any person . . . except a . . . licensed dealer.”  Id. 
at 1104.  The court reasoned that while the Gun Control Act affords 
corporate entities with the status of legal parenthood, “any corporate 
applicant must provide a wealth of information about each ‘responsible 
person,’ owner, and partner of the company.”  Id. at 1105.  The court 
posted that the proposed agency instructions were “at odds with the Gun 
Control Act’s purpose and comprehensive nature.”  Id.  The court 
refused to endorse a rule that would allow an agent to escape criminal 
liability simply because he had been authorized by his principal to so act.  
Id. 
CONCLUSION; The 9th Circuit concluded that a defendant charged 
with unlawful dealing in firearms in violation of § 922(a)(1)(A) is not 
entitled to receive a jury instruction requiring the government to prove 
that the defendant “was not acting as an authorized agent of a federal 
firearms licensee.”  Id. at 1101, 1106. 
 
USW Local 12-639 v. USW International, 728 F.3d 1107 (9th Cir. 
2013) 
QUESTION; Whether claims under the Labor-Management 
Reporting and Disclosure Act (LMRDA) § 609 protect elected and not 
appointed union officers from discipline suffered in their official 
capacities.  Id. at 1115. 
ANALYSIS: The court noted that the Conference Report 
accompanying the LMDRA explained that “prohibition on suspension 
without observing certain safeguards applies only to suspension of 
membership in the union; it does not refer to suspension of a member’s 
status as an officer of the union.”  Id. at 1117.  The court further 
reasoned that Congress did not intend for § 609 and other sections of the 
LMRDA “to protect against disciplinary actions that impinge on the 
incidents of union employment, regardless of appointed versus elected 
status.”  Id.  The court posited that because § 609 does not apply to 
actions directed against appointed union officers in their official 
capacities, it should not apply to actions directed against elected union 
officers.  Id. 
CONCLUSION; The 9th Circuit held that “LMDRA § 609 does not 
protect union officers from discipline suffered in their official 
capacities.”  Id. at 1109. 
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TENTH CIRCUIT 
United States v. Crowe, 735 F.3d 1229 (10th Cir. 2013) 
QUESTION; Whether under U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b) the concept of 
reasonable foreseeability applies to a district court’s calculation of 
“actual loss” rather than its calculation of “credits against loss.”  Id. at 
1235–36. 
ANALYSIS; The court noted that the 2nd Circuit interpreted the 
language of U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1 and its accompanying commentary as 
applying “reasonable foreseeability” to “actual loss” only.  Id. at 1236–
37. The court reasoned that because the language in Note 3 of U.S.S.G. 
§ 2B1.1 treats amounts recovered by fraud victims as “credits against 
loss,” it is irrelevant whether a defendant “reasonably anticipated a 
precipitous decline in the real estate market that might result in the 
original lender or successor lenders being unable to recoup their losses 
from the sale of pledged collateral should she default.”  Id. at 1237. The 
court posited that the only foreseeability issue to be determined was the 
“reasonable foreseeability of the ‘actual loss’” and not during the 
calculation of “credits against loss.”  Id. 
CONCLUSION; The 10th Circuit held that when calculating loss for 
the “purposes of U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b) applies only to a district court’s 
calculation of ‘actual loss,’ and not to its calculation of the ‘credits 
against loss.’”  Id. at 1241. 
 
Wadsworth v. World of Life Christian Center, 737 F.3d 1268 (10th Cir. 
2013) 
QUESTION; “Whether, in the event that a restricted debtor transfers 
more than 15% of his gross annual income (GAI) to a qualified religious 
or charitable organization, a trustee may avoid the entire annual transfer 
or only the portion exceeding 15%.”  Id. at 1271. 
ANALYSIS; The court stated that “the plain language [of 11 U.S.C. 
§ 548(a)(2)] subjected the entire transfer to avoidance if the transfer 
exceeded 15% of the debtor’s GAI.”  Id. The court further noted that 
nothing in the plain language of the statute indicates that, if the transfer 
exceeds 15% of the debtor’s GAI, only the portion exceeding 15% is 
avoidable.  Id. 
CONCLUSION; The 1st Circuit held that in the event that a 
restricted debtor transfers more than 15% of his GAI to a qualified 
religious or charitable organization, a trustee may avoid the entire annual 
transfer.  Id. 
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ELEVENTH CIRCUIT 
Black Warrior Riverkeeper, Inc. v. Black Warrior Minerals, 734 F.3d 
1297 (11th Cir. 2013) 
QUESTION; “Whether a citizen [filing suit under the Clean Water 
Act] may evade the 60-day waiting period and sue a permit holder for 
violations of the new source performance standards when those standards 
are incorporated in the permit.” Id. at 1300. 
ANALYSIS; The court reasoned that “[a]lthough the Act provides 
for citizen suits, it erects two hurdles for citizens to overcome before 
they commence a civil action against a discharger.”  Id. at 1301.  First, 
the citizen must provide notice to federal and state authorities before 
waiting 60 days prior to filing suit.  Id. at 1302.  Second, where the 
federal or state authorities commence suit first against the discharger, the 
citizen is barred from bringing a separate lawsuit (although the citizen 
may join the government suit).  Id.  The court noted, “Congress provided 
no exception to the 60-day waiting period for citizen suits about 
violations of permit conditions.”  Id.  The court interpreted the Act 
within the entirety of its context, not “interpreting a provision in a way 
that would render other provisions of the statute superfluous.”  Id. at 
1303.  The court stated that the provision in question “does not exempt 
suits based on violations of permit conditions.”  Id. 
CONCLUSION; The 11th Circuit held that to allow this type of suit 
against a permit holder “would disrupt the statutory scheme for the 
enforcement of permits . . . [by] both undermin[ing] the overarching 
shame and nullify[ing] the statuary preference for government 
enforcement.”  Id. at 1304. 
 
Durango-Georgia Paper Co. v. H.G. Estate, LLC, 739 F.3d 1263 (11th 
Cir. 2014) 
QUESTION; Whether under 29 U.S.C. § 1369 of the Employee 
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) “the trustee of a 
corporation that is a contributing sponsor and is in bankruptcy can 
maintain an action for the benefit of the bankruptcy estate and the 
estate’s unsecured creditors against the corporation’s former 
owner . . . for liabilities arising from the termination of a pension plan.”  
Id. at 1266. 
ANALYSIS; The 11th Circuit noted that nothing in ERISA’s 
provisions or its legislative history suggests that “the duty of a current or 
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former controlled group to pay unfunded benefit liabilities is a duty owed 
to the employer as contributing sponsor, rather than to the plan’s 
beneficiaries.”  Id. at 1272.  The court found that the House Report 
relevant to ERISA states that the purpose of § 1369 was “to protect the 
[Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation’s] insurance program from 
companies that transfer large amounts of unfunded benefits to a weaker 
company or that otherwise attempt to evade liability for their pension 
promises.”  Id.  The court also found that the report makes it plain that 
§ 1369 “applies to any situations in which a principal purpose of a 
transaction is to evade liability to participants and beneficiaries for 
benefit entitlements.”  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  Therefore, 
the court found that ERISA clearly put funding requirements in place 
“for the benefit of plan beneficiaries, not for the protection of a bankrupt 
plan sponsor’s unsecured creditors.”  Id. at 1273. 
CONCLUSION; The 11th Circuit held that under ERISA, the trustee 
of a corporation that was a contributing sponsor and was in bankruptcy 
could not maintain an action for the benefit of the bankruptcy estate and 
the estate’s unsecured creditors against the corporation’s former owner 
for liabilities arising from the termination of a pension plan.  Id. at 1266. 
 
Lesinski v. South Florida Water Management District, 739 F.3d 598 
(11th Cir. 2014) 
QUESTION; Whether the arm of the state analysis under the 
Eleventh Amendment should be used to determine whether a state entity 
is a “person” for liability purposes under the False Claims Act (FCA).  
Id. at 601. 
ANALYSIS; The court noted that the “Eleventh Amendment largely 
shields states from suit in federal courts without their consent, leaving 
parties with claims against a State to present them, if the State permits, in 
the State’s own tribunals.”  Id.  The court also noted that the “Eleventh 
Amendment’s protection extends not only to the state itself, but also to 
state officers and entities when they act as an arm of the state.”  Id. 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  The court stated in contrast, that the 
FCA imposes liability on “any person” who “knowingly presents, or 
causes to be presented, a false claim or fraudulent claim for payment.”  
Id.  The court noted that the Supreme Court has held that the term 
“person” under the FCA “cannot include states or state agencies, at least 
for qui tam purposes.”  Id.  The court also noted that the Supreme Court 
has also held that there is a “virtual coincidence of scope between the 
statutory inquiry into whether States can be sued under the FCA and the 
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Eleventh Amendment inquiry into whether unconsenting States can be 
sued under the FCA.”  Id. 
CONCLUSION; The 11th Circuit joined the 4th, 5th, 9th and 10th 
Circuits in holding that “courts should employ the Eleventh Amendment 
arm of the state analysis to determine whether a state entity is a ‘person’ 
subject to FCA liability.”  Id. at 602. 
 
United States v. Mathauda, 740 F.3d 565 (11th Cir. 2014) 
QUESTION; “Whether willful blindness satisfies the knowing 
requirement of [U.S.S.G.] § 2B1.1(b)(8)(C).  Id. at 568. 
ANALYSIS: The court noted that the D.C. Circuit has “held that a 
district court did not err when it applied a sentencing enhancement based 
on the defendant’s violation of a prior court order, despite the 
defendant’s alleged lack of knowledge of the order, because he was 
willfully blind to the order he violated.”  Id.  The court reasoned that 
“there are two predominant formulations of ‘willful blindness’: when a 
defendant purposely contrived to avoid learning all the facts, or the 
defendant was aware of a high probability of the fact in dispute and 
consciously avoided confirming the fact.”  Id. 568–69 (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
CONCLUSION; The 11th Circuit agreed with the D.C. Circuit and 
held that willful blindness satisfies the knowing requirement of 
§ 2B1.1(b)(8)(C).  Id. 
 
 
D.C. CIRCUIT 
 
United States v. Martinez-Cruz, 736 F.3d 999 (D.C. Cir. 2013) 
QUESTION; Whether “due process requirements are satisfied if the 
defendant meets a burden of production but must then face a burden of 
persuading the court that the prior conviction was secured in violation of 
his right to counsel.”  Id. at 1002. 
ANALYSIS; The court explained that the question creates tension 
between “the presumption of regularity to final judgments” and the 
“unique constitutional defect” in the failure to provide counsel.  Id. at 
1002–03. The court reasoned that “[w]ithout defense counsel, the 
original proceedings are far less likely to yield a record that can clearly 
resolve the validity of the prior proceeding.”  Id. at 1003.  The court also 
recognized the government’s superior access to the evidence when such 
an appeal occurs.  Id. at 1004. 
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CONCLUSION; The D.C. Circuit held that “the government [has] 
the ultimate burden of persuasion, but only once the defendant produces 
objective evidence sufficient to support a reasonable inference that his 
right to counsel was not validly waived.”  Id. 
 
 
FEDERAL CIRCUIT 
In re City of Houston, 731 F.3d 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2013) 
QUESTION; “[W]hether § 2(b) of the Lanham Act bars a local 
government entity, such as Houston and the District [of Columbia], from 
registering [a trademark for] its own insignia.”  Id. at 1330. 
ANALYSIS; The court looked to the plain language of the statute 
and determined that § 2(b) of the Lanham Act “prohibits registration of 
an insignia of the United States, or of any State or municipality.”  Id. at 
1331 (internal quotation marks omitted).  The court reasoned further that  
“nothing in this plain language that suggests a government entity such as 
Houston should be exempted from the reach of the prohibition.”  Id. 
CONCLUSION; The Federal Circuit concluded that “the context of 
§ 2(b) supports the plain language of the prohibition and Houston’s 
identity as a governmental entity does not free it from the reach of 
§ 2(b).”  Id. The Federal Circuit similarly held that § 2(b) of the Lanham 
Act prohibited the District of Columbia from registering its trademark.  
Id. at 1335. 
 
LifeScan Scotland, Ltd. v. Shasta Technologies, LLC, 734 F.3d 1361 
(Fed. Cir. 2013). 
QUESTION; “[W]hether patent exhaustion applies to a product 
distributed for free.”  Id. at 1374. 
ANALYSIS; The court posited that “the [Supreme] Court has never 
confined the application of patent exhaustion to [the] context [of 
sale] . . . .”  Id.  The court noted that “the [Supreme] Court has more 
fundamentally described exhaustion as occurring when the patented 
product passes to the hands of a transferee and when he legally acquires 
title to it.”  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  The court reasoned 
that the Supreme Court’s language “is broad enough to include a transfer 
of title that does not amount to a sale.”  Id. 
CONCLUSION; The Federal Circuit held “that, in the case of an 
authorized and unconditional transfer of title, the absence of 
consideration is no barrier to the application of patent exhaustion 
principles.  Id. 
Spring 2014] First Impressions 357 
	
 
Pacific Coast Marine Windshields Ltd. v. Malibu Boats, LLC, 739 F.3d 
694 (Fed. Cir. 2014) 
QUESTION; Whether “the concept of prosecution history estoppel 
applies to design patents as well as utility patents.”  Id. at 700. 
ANALYSIS; The court noted that “treatises and district court 
opinions going back to 1889 have recognized that the concept of 
prosecution history estoppel applies to design patents as well as utility 
patents . . . .”  Id.  The court reasoned that “[t]he same principles of 
public notice that underlie prosecution history estoppel apply to design 
patents as well as utility patents.”  Id. at 702.  The court posited that 
“[p]rosecution history estoppel in design patents promotes the clarity that 
is essential to promote progress,” [and] [r]efusing to apply the principles 
of prosecution history estoppel to design patents would undermine the 
definitional and public notice requirements of the statutory claiming 
requirement.”  Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
CONCLUSION; The Federal Circuit held “that the principles of 
prosecution history estoppel apply to design patents as well as utility 
patents.”  Id. 
 
Tembenis v. Secretary of HHS, 733 F.3d 1190 (Fed. Cir. 2013) 
QUESTION; Whether the estate of a petitioner who dies prior to 
judgment is entitled to compensation for lost future earnings under 42 
U.S.C. § 300aa-15(a)(3)(B) of the National Childhood Vaccine Injury 
Act (Vaccine Act).  Id. at 1191. 
ANALYSIS; The court considered the different forms of 
compensation allowed under § 300aa-15(a) of the Vaccine Act, noting 
that subsection (a)(3) treats those over the age of 18 differently from 
those under the age of 18.  Id. at 1193–94. The court further noted that 
the statute refers to “the impairment of future earnings capacity,” and not 
the “termination of such capacity.” Id. at 1195.  The court found that 
subsection (a)(3)(B) presumes “a person who is alive at the time an 
award for future lost earnings is made would have had an earning 
capacity as of age 18 but for the vaccine-related injury.”  Id.  
Accordingly, the court reasoned that if the claimant dies before the 
compensation is awarded, “there is no reasonable expectation” that the 
claimant would reach the age of 18.  Id. 
CONCLUSION; The Federal Circuit held that eligibility for future 
lost earnings under § 300aa-15(a)(3)(B) requires the person suffering 
from a vaccine-related injury to survive the compensation judgment.  Id. 
at 1191. 
